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Abstract: Through the Association of African Central Bank Governors, in 2003, Africa committed itself to 
work for a single currency and common central bank by 2021. In pursuit of this grand objective, many regional 
trading blocs including the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the East African 
Community (EAC) are involved in various economic integration activities. Forming a monetary union is a 
serious endeavour that needs serious and deliberate consideration. Sufficient and sound economic basis, such 
as similar economic structures, should be in place. The purpose of this paper was to assess the feasibility of 
monetary union in the SADC and EAC by determining the similarities of the economic structures in the regions 
through business cycle synchronisation. This study uses annual real GDP of each country in the two regions 
for a period of 30 years. The results of correlation analysis and T-Y Granger causality test suggest that there is 
overwhelming lack of business cycle synchronisation in the two economic regions, suggesting that it is not 
feasible to form a monetary union in these two economic regions as envisaged in the timeframe. The two 
economic regions, therefore, need to set and coordinate major macroeconomic policies to harmonise and 
achieve sustainable economic development goals in their respective regions. 
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1. Introduction 
Through the Association of African Central Bank Governors, in 2003, Africa committed itself to work 
for a single currency and common central bank by 2021 (Mboweni, 2003; Masson & Pattillo, 2004a; 
Guma, 2007). This commitment is in line with Article 44 of Abuja Treaty, which calls for the 
harmonisation of economic policies across the African continent. The treaty`s two important pillars of 
economic integration across the African continent are the promotion of intra-Africa trade and the 
enhancement of monetary co-operation (Mboweni, 2003).  
In pursuit of this grand objective, many regional trading blocs and economic communities in Africa are 
in various economic integration activities. For example, the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) is set to have a monetary union by 2016 and a single currency by 2018 (McCarthy, 2008; 
Kowlessur et al., 2013). Similarly, the East African Community (EAC), having established a customs 
union (CU) in 2005 and a common market in 2010, had planned to implement a monetary union, which 
will culminate in a political federation in the future (Buigut & Valev, 2005; Sheikh et al., 2013). The 
EAC member countries, in 2013, signed a Protocol on the establishment of the East African Community 
Monetary Union which sets a framework for the introduction of a single currency and the establishment 
of the East African Central Bank, whose mandate will be price stability, by 2024 (Drummond et al., 
2015). Other regional blocs such as the Arab Monetary Union (AMA), the Economic Community of 
Central African States (ECCAS), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are also in the process of integrating their 
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economies for this purpose through the introduction of monetary unions in their respective regions 
(Masson & Pattillo, 2004a).  
The rationale for the economic integration primarily influenced by the desire to counteract the perceived 
economic and political weaknesses of the continent and the successful launching of the euro (Masson & 
Pattillo, 2004b). Similarly, McCarthy (2008) is of the view that Europe has set the world a commendable 
example of economic integration and is largely seen as a role model in Africa in as far as monetary 
union is concerned. However, the move towards African economic integration should not be seen only 
from this perspective; there is a different narrative. The goal of a single currency has long been a pillar 
of African unity and a symbol of strength since the inception of the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU) in 1936. (Masson & Pattillo, 2001) 
In addition, macroeconomic interdependence is cited as the rationale of Regional Trade Agreements 
(RTA) across the world (Adom et al., 2010). Van Der Merwe and Mollentze (2010) are of the view that 
international interdependence has been on the rise since the 1970s and has generated spillover effects, 
also called externalities. The authors describe externalities as the benefits and cost that one country or a 
group of countries derive from the actions of other countries. To overcome the effects of externalities 
and develop their economies, countries across the world have been establishing different forms of 
regional economic integration at different degrees and levels promoted and supported by the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). (Hartzenberg, 2011)  
The ultimate goal of regional economic integration is to merge certain or all facets of the economic 
activities. This usually evolves from simple cooperation of mutually agreed economic activities amongst 
member countries to full economic integration or merger of the economies in question (Maruping, 2005). 
Forming a monetary union is a serious endeavour by any stretch of imagination that needs serious and 
deliberate consideration. Indeed, since independence, African countries have embraced regional 
integration as a key component of their development strategies and signed a number of regional 
integration arrangements (RIAs) (Hartzenberg, 2011). Such initiatives are good politics, but to survive 
they must extend beyond unfilled good intentions and have a sufficiently sound economic basis (Melo 
& Tsikata, 2013) because some of the initiatives are generally ambitious programs with unrealistic time 
frames towards deeper integration and in some cases even political union (Hartzenberg, 2011). The 
purpose of this paper is to establish the feasibility of monetary union in the SADC and EAC by 
determining the similarities of the economic structures in the regions through business cycle 
synchronisation. 
Similarity of economic structures among potential member countries is considered an important facet in 
forming a monetary union, according to the optimum currency area (OCA) theory (Kenen, 1963). The 
OCA theory was pioneered by Mundell in 1961 in response to the prevailing debate on the merits and 
demerits of fixed versus flexible exchange rates (Ishiyama, 1975; Marco, 2014). McKinnon and Kenen 
also made important contributions to the theory. The ground-breaking work on the OCA later earned 
Mundell a Nobel Prize in economics, which subsequently paved the way for the establishment of the 
euro (Ngo, 2012, p. 66). Mundell rightly is regarded as the father of the OCA theory (Bayoumi & 
Eichengreen, 1998). Mundell (1961) describes an OCA as an “optimum geographic area” in which a 
group of countries share a common currency or maintain their own currencies, which have permanently 
fixed exchange rates with full convertibility. Dellas and Tavlas (2009) opine that similarity of economic 
structures and fiscal integration among economies are crucial aspects of Kenen’s contribution to the 
OCA theory. De Haan et al. (2008) suggest that economies, whose business cycles converge, constitute 
good candidates for a monetary union.  
GDP as comprehensive measure of economic activity is used to measure the symmetry/asymmetry of 
the economies in the two regions in this study. Numerous studies have utilised this approach (Artis & 
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Zhang, 2001; Zhang et al., 2004; Byström et al., 2005, p. 619; Amoah, 2013; Sheikh et al., 2013). High 
degrees of business cycle synchronisation amongst members of a monetary union are crucial for a 
smooth functioning of a given monetary union as it eases the management of economic policies, in 
particular, in applying a single monetary policy (Gayer, 2007, p. 2). De Haan et al. (2008) concur and 
suggest that economies whose business cycles converge constitute good candidates for a monetary 
union. Evidence on lack of synchronisation of growth rates across countries suggests only limited 
economic convergence of the economies concerned (Drummond et al., 2015, p. 5). It also is argued that 
monetary union by itself and the economic and financial integration of the economies could spur the 
occurrence of a common area-wide business cycle synchronisation (Gayer, 2007, p. 2). This paper seeks 
to establish the feasibility of monetary union in the two African economic regions namely SADC and 
EAC on the tenents of Kenen`s theory. 
 
2. Research Methodology 
Annual real GDP, as a percentage change, of all the countries in the two regions were downloaded from 
IMF (World Economic Outlook Database) from 1986 to 2015 (30 years) to assess business cycle 
synchronisation (similarities of economic structures). Similarity in economic structure is considered an 
important facet in forming a monetary union, according to the OCA theory (Kenen, 1963). De Haan et 
al. (2008) suggest that economies whose business cycles converge constitute good candidates for a 
monetary union. GDP as comprehensive measure of economic activity was used to measure the 
symmetry/asymmetry of the economies in the two regions in this study.  
Correlation analysis and Granger causality test were used to assess the synchronisation of business 
cycles. The OCA states that member countries that aim to form a monetary union should have similar 
economics structures. To assess this, correlation analysis was found to be appropriate as applied in 
previous studies (Artis & Zhang, 2001; Zhang et al., 2004; Byström et al., 2005; Amoah, 2013; Sheikh 
et al., 2013). Correlation analysis explains the degree to which changes in certain variable are associated 
with changes in another variable (McDaniel & Gates, 2002). In assessing the size of the Pearson 
correlation coefficients, Cohen’s d-measure of effect sizes was used to measure the importance of an 
effect. An absolute value ranging from 0.10 to 0.29 denotes a weak relationship, values between 0.30 
and 0.49 represent a medium relationship and a value of 0.50 to 1.00 indicates a strong relationship 
between the variables (Pallant, 2013). A positive and significant correlation coefficient would indicate 
synchronous business cycle (i.e. having business cycle synchronisation) while a negative coefficient 
indicates asynchronous business cycle (i.e. lack of business cycle synchronisation).  
To supplement the findings of correlations analysis, the pairwise Granger causality test was conducted. 
The Granger causality test is a statistical hypothesis test for determining whether one time series can be 
used in forecasting another (Granger, 1969). Granger causality test involves estimating the following 
Vector Autoregressive model: 
GDPA𝑡 = 𝐶10 + ∑ 𝛼1𝑖GDPA𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑗GDPB𝑡−𝑖 + 𝑒1𝑡
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1       (1) 
GDPB𝑡 =  𝐶20 + ∑ 𝛽2𝑖GDPB𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛼2𝑗GDPA𝑡−𝑖 + 𝑒2𝑡
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1       (2) 
Where GDPAt and GDPB represent the real GDPt growth for country A and B at time t, respectively. 
𝛼1𝑖, 𝛼2𝑖, 𝛽2𝑗and 𝛽1𝑗 are the coefficients for the lags of the real GDP growth. 𝐶10 and 𝐶20are the 
intercepts, while e1t and e2t are uncorrelated error terms. Equation (1) postulates that current GDPAt is 
related to past values of itself as well as that of GDPBt. Similarly, Equation 2 postulates that current 
GDPBt is related to past values of itself as well as that of GDPAt.  
The hypothesis tests for both equations are set as follows:  
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For equation 1:  
 Null Hypothesis (H0): 𝛽11 = 𝛽12 … = 𝛽1𝑗 = 0, GDPB does not Granger-cause GDPA 
 Alternative Hypothesis (H1): 𝛽11 ≠ 𝛽12 … ≠ 𝛽1𝑗 ≠ 0, GDPB Granger-cause GDPA  
For equation 2:  
 H0: 𝛼11 = 𝛼12 … = 𝛼1𝑗 = 0, GDPA does not Granger-cause GDPB 
 H1: 𝛼11 ≠ 𝛼12 … ≠ 𝛼1𝑗 ≠ 0, GDPB Granger-cause GDPA 
In equation 1, if the H0 is rejected then a conclusion can be drawn that the GDP growth rate of country 
B is related to In equation 1, if the H0 is rejected then a conclusion can be drawn that the GDP growth 
rate of country B is related to its past economic performance and the economic performance of country 
A. Similarly, the rejection of H0 in equation 2 implies that GDP growth rate of country A is related to 
its past economic performance and the economic performance of country B.  
Prior to undertaking the Granger causality test, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test was 
conducted to check if series are stationary. If variables are found to be stationary the normal Granger 
causality test is estimated. However, if variables are not stationary at level I(0), or are a mixture of I(0) 
and I(0) then the Toda & Yamamoto (T-Y) (1995) approach to Granger causality is utilised. Using the 
T-Y approach to Granger causality, our VAR model is expressed as follows:  
GDPA𝑡 = 𝐶10 + ∑ 𝛼1𝑖GDPA𝑡−𝑖 + ∑𝑗=𝑘+1
𝑘+𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥𝛼1𝑗𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐴𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑖GDPB𝑡−𝑖 +
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
          ∑𝑗=𝑘+1
𝑘+𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥𝛽1𝑗𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐵𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑒1𝑡            (3) 
 
GDPB𝑡 =  𝐶20 + ∑ 𝛽2𝑖GDPB𝑡−𝑖 + ∑𝑗=𝑘+1
𝑘+𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥𝛽2𝑗𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐵𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ 𝛼2𝑗GDPA𝑡−𝑖 +
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
         ∑𝑗=𝑘+1
𝑘+𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥𝛼2𝑗𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐴𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑒2𝑡             (4) 
Where: dmax is maximum order of integration for the group of time-series. Additionally, an optimal lag 
length was selected in the VAR system. The criteria used for lag selection include Logl statistic, LR test 
statistic, final prediction error (FPE), Akaike information criterion (AIC), Schwarz information criterion 
(SIC) and Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQIC). 
 
3. Results and Discussion 
3.1. Synchronisation of Business Cycles in SADC 
Correlation analysis and Granger causality test are used to examine the similarities of economic 
structure. Table 1 reports business cycle synchronisation computed through correlation analysis for the 
14-member SADC region. Out of the 91 possible bivariate relationships only 12 were with positive and 
significant correlations, 25 with negative and insignificant correlations and 54 with positive but 
insignificant correlations. The 12 positive bivariate relationships showed medium-to-strong correlations 
coefficients when assessed against Cohen’s d-measure effect sizes. Thus, they showed convergence in 
business cycles. However, these positive relations were mixed. In other words, the positive correlations 
were not necessarily among specific and recurring countries. These correlations (business cycle 
synchronisation) occurred between Angola and DRC, Angola and South Africa, Angola and Tanzania, 
Angola and Zambia, Botswana and Swaziland, DRC and South Africa, DRC and Tanzania, DRC and 
Zambia, Malawi and Zambia, Mauritius and Swaziland, Mozambique and South Africa and Tanzania 
and Zambia.  
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The biggest worry, however, is with bivariate relations that showed divergence in business cycles (25 
with negative and insignificant correlations and 54 with positive but insignificant correlations). The 79 
(25+54) of 91 bivariate relationships showed lack of business cycle synchronisation. It, therefore, is 
clear from the forgoing analysis that there is no convincing evidence that suggest business cycle 
synchronisation. The business cycle convergence noticed between the few bivariate relationships are 
just too little to suggest similarities in economic structure in the SADC region because the divergence 
in business cycle synchronisation is overwhelming. Thus, the SADC region does not constitute an OCA 
in as far as business cycle synchronisation is concerned. 
The next step was to conduct Granger causality test for further analysis. Before conducting the Granger 
causality test, the unit root test was conducted. ADF results, in Table 2, show that some variables are 
stationary at levels, while others become stationary at first differences. This means that there is a mixture 
of I(0) and I(1), implying that the normal Granger causality cannot be used. Hence, the Toda and 
Yamamoto (Y-T) approach to Granger causality test was utilised to test for causal relationship between 
the various GDPs.  
Table 1. Business cycle synchronisation for SADC (1986-2015) 
COUNTRY AGO 
BW
A 
DRC LSO 
MD
G 
MWI MUS 
MO
Z 
NA
M 
SYC RSA SWZ TAN ZMB 
Angola 1.00              
Botswana 
 
0.18 1.00             
0.33              
DRC 
 
.600* 0.12 1.00            
0.00 0.53             
Lesotho 
 
-0.13 0.23 -0.09 1.00           
0.51 0.22 0.63            
Madagascar 
 
0.13 0.12 0.15 0.10 1.00          
0.50 0.53 0.43 0.61           
Malawi 
 
0.22 0.22 0.23 -0.02 0.02 1.00         
0.24 0.25 0.22 0.93 0.92          
Mauritius 
 
-0.19 0.35 -0.27 0.23 0.24 -0.10 1.00        
0.32 0.06 0.15 0.22 0.19 0.62         
Mozambique 
 
0.28 0.13 0.08 -0.22 0.04 0.26 -0.15 1.00       
0.13 0.49 0.66 0.23 0.83 0.16 0.42        
Namibia 0.27 0.14 0.27 0.07 -0.17 -0.26 -0.07 -0.30 1.00      
0.15 0.45 0.15 0.71 0.36 0.17 0.70 0.11       
Seychelles 
 
0.04 0.29 -0.16 0.26 0.04 0.19 0.08 0.19 0.12 1.00     
0.85 0.11 0.39 0.16 0.82 0.31 0.67 0.31 0.51      
South Africa 
 
.649* 0.34 .377* -0.03 0.35 0.15 -0.18 .430* -0.02 0.13 1.00    
0.00 0.06 0.04 0.87 0.06 0.43 0.34 0.02 0.91 0.48     
Swaziland 
 
-0.02 .445* 0.03 0.04 0.11 -0.11 .602* -0.08 0.01 0.14 -0.05 1.00   
0.91 0.01 0.88 0.81 0.55 0.56 0.00 0.67 0.97 0.45 0.79    
Tanzania 
 
.479* 0.16 .771* -0.18 0.16 0.24 -0.10 0.09 0.17 -0.07 0.35 0.10 1.00  
0.01 0.40 0.00 0.33 0.39 0.20 0.58 0.62 0.37 0.72 0.06 0.60   
Zambia 
 
.445* 0.21 .554* 0.15 0.19 .487* -0.17 0.17 0.10 0.06 0.31 -0.25 .534* 1.00 
0.01 0.26 0.00 0.44 0.32 0.01 0.37 0.36 0.59 0.74 0.09 0.19 0.00  
* Correlation is a least significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
The next step was to conduct Granger causality test for further analysis. Before conducting the Granger 
causality test, the unit root test was conducted. ADF results, in Table 2, show that some variables are 
stationary at levels, while others become stationary at first differences. This means that there is a mixture 
of I(0) and I(1), implying that the normal Granger causality cannot be used. Hence, the Toda and 
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Yamamoto (Y-T) approach to Granger causality test was utilised to test for causal relationship between 
the various GDPs.  
Table 2. Unit root test results of GDP growth for SADC countries 
Countries 
ADF (Level) ADF (1st diff) 
Order of 
integration t-Statistic 
Critical 
values 
t-Statistic Critical values 
Angola -2.969998 -2.9719 -5.1050 -2.9763 I(1) 
Botswana -4.425965 -2.9678 -------- -------- I(0) 
DRC -0.90437 -2.9763 -4.9153 -2.9763 I(1) 
Lesotho -4.11302 -2.9678 -------- -------- I(0) 
Madagascar -6.16752 -2.96778 -------- -------- I(0) 
Malawi -6.56583 -2.9678 -------- -------- I(0) 
Mauritius -4.38647 -2.9678 -------- -------- I(0) 
Mozambique -6.15208 -2.9678 -------- -------- I(0) 
Namibia -5.87598 -2.9678 -------- -------- I(0) 
Seychelles  -4.504774 -2.9719 -------- -------- I(0) 
South Africa -3.06860 -2.9678 -------- -------- I(0) 
Swaziland  -2.900884 -2.9678 -------- -------- I(0) 
Tanzania -1.13293 -2.9763 -5.6222 -2.9763 I(1) 
Zambia -5.78844 -2.981038 -------- -------- I(0) 
Note 1: Test critical values for ADF is at 5% 
The Y-T Granger causality test was conducted to supplement the outcome of the correlation analysis. 
The whole result of a pairwise Granger causality is not included in this paper in the interest of keeping 
space. Table 3 reports only a pool of those that showed significant Granger causality results. Of the 182 
unidirectional Granger causality relationships, only 20 were found to be significant, at the 5 percent 
level of significance; indicating unidirectional Granger causality between the countries. The results of 
the Granger causality test confirm the results of the correlation analysis. The weight of evidence suggests 
that there is lack of business cycle synchronisation in the SADC region.  
Table 3. Business cycle Granger causality test for SADC (P-values of Chi-square) 
Null hypothesis Probability 
ANGOLA does not Granger Cause MADAGASCAR 0.0454 
ANGOLA does not Granger Cause MALAWI 0.0145 
ANGOLA does not Granger Cause Zambia 0.0005 
BOTSWANA does not Granger Cause SOUTH AFRICA 0.0050 
BOTSWANA does not Granger Cause SWAZILAND 0.0100 
 DRC does not Granger Cause MALAWI 0.0162 
 DRC does not Granger Cause TANZANIA 0.0153 
 DRC does not Granger Cause ZAMBIA 0.0011 
 LESOTHO does not Granger Cause SOUTH AFRICA 0.0345 
NAMIBIA does not Granger Cause ANGOLA 0.0003 
NAMIBIA does not Granger Cause ZAMBIA 0.0375 
SOUTH AFRICA does not Granger Cause ANGOLA 0.0029 
SOUTH_AFRICA does not Granger Cause MADAGASCAR 0.0273 
 SWAZILAND does not Granger Cause BOTSWANA 0.0005 
 SWAZILAND does not Granger Cause DRC 0.0309 
SWAZILAND does not Granger Cause TANZANIA 0.0048 
SWAZILAND does not Granger Cause LESOTHO 0.0296 
TANZANIA does not Granger Cause ZAMBIA 0.0151 
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ZAMBIA does not Granger Cause DRC 0.0359 
ZAMBIA does not Granger Cause MOZAMBIQUE 0.0071 
3.2. Synchronisation of business cycles in EAC 
Correlation analysis Granger causality test are used to examine the similarities of economic structure in 
EAC. Table 4 reports business cycle synchronisation computed through correlation analysis for the 5-
member EAC region. The results indicate that out of the 10 possible bivariate relationships, three were 
with positive and significant correlations, only one with negative and insignificant correlations and six 
with positive but insignificant correlations.  
The three positive bivariate relationships showed medium-to-strong correlations coefficients signifying 
high level of synchronisation. The common denominator in this positive bivariate relationship was 
Tanzania. These correlations (business cycle synchronisation) occurred between Tanzania and Burundi, 
Tanzania and Tanzania and Rwanda. The only clear divergence occurred between Burundi and Uganda 
showing asynchronous business cycles. The six positive with insignificant correlation could not show 
business cycle convergence (i.e. there is lack of business synchronisation).  
It, therefore, is clear from the preceding analysis, whilst EAC region is in a much better position than 
the SADC region, that there is no convincing evidence that suggest business cycle synchronisation. The 
business cycle convergence noticed between the few (3 out of 10) bivariate relationships fall short of 
suggesting similarities in economic structure in the EAC region because of the existence of significant 
(7 out of 10) divergence in the business cycles. Thus, the evidence from the business cycle 
synchronisation suggests that EAC is not an OCA. 
Table 4. Business cycle synchronisation for EAC (1986-2015) 
  Burundi Kenya Rwanda Tanzania Uganda 
Burundi 1.00     
Kenya 
  
0.26 1.00    
0.16     
Rwanda 
  
0.11 0.10 1.00   
0.58 0.60    
Tanzania 
  
.404* .615* .394* 1.00  
0.03 0.00 0.03   
Uganda 
  
-0.35 0.02 0.18 0.10 1 
0.06 0.91 0.34 0.61  
*. Correlation is at least significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
To supplement the findings of the correlation analysis, Granger causality test computed but the unit root 
test was conducted to check if series are stationary. Table 5, show that there is mixture of I(0) and I(1), 
implying that Toda and Yamamoto approach to Granger Causality test (equations 3 & 4) should be used. 
Thus, the maximum order of integration for the group of time-series, dmax, is 1. The results of lag length 
selection (not reported here) show that our B-VAR model should be estimated with 2 lags. Thus, our 
VAR was estimated with one (dmax) additional lag on the top of the selected 2 lags.  
Table 5. Unit root test results of GDP growth for EAC countries 
Countries 
ADF (Level) ADF (1st diff) Order of 
integration  t-statistic Critical values t-Statistic Critical values 
Burundi -2.1747 -2.9678 -4.4317 -2.9719 I(1) 
Kenya -3.2778 -2.9678 ---- ----- I(0) 
Rwanda -4.8471 -2.9678 ---- ----- I(0) 
Tanzania -1.1329 -2.9763 -5.6222 -3.574244 I(1) 
Uganda -4.209310 -2.9678 ---- ----- I(0) 
Note 1: Test critical values for ADF is at 5%.  
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Results of T-Y Granger causality are summarised in Table 6. Of the 20 unidirectional Granger causality 
relationships, only two (2) were found to be significant, one at the 5 and 10 percent levels of significance. 
The lags of Kenyan GDP cannot be omitted in the equation for Tanzania (at the 5 percent levels of 
significance), implying that economic growth in Kenya Granger cause the economic growth in Tanzania. 
The lags of Uganda’s GDP cannot be excluded in the Tanzania’s equation (at the 10 percent levels of 
significance); suggesting the Ugandan economic growth Granger cause the economic growth in 
Tanzania. The results of the Granger causality test generally support the results of the correlation 
analysis although the correlation analysis had indicated some evidence of business cycle 
synchronisation. The overall results suggest there is indeed lack of business cycle synchronisation in the 
EAC region.  
Table 6. Results of VAR Granger causality test for EAC (P-value. of Chi-square) 
 
Excluded 
Dependent variable 
BURUNDI KENYA RWANDA TANZANIA UGANDA 
Burundi ---------- 0.0781 0.9968 0.1807  0.9896 
Kenya  0.8815 --------- 0.9390 0.0268  0.7627 
Rwanda  0.1524 0.2677 -------- 0.3831  0.7775 
Tanzania  0.6380 0.2424 0.1952 --------  0.9243 
Uganda  0.3846 0.2739  0.4554 0.0804 -------- 
From the foregoing analysis, it is evident that the weight of evidence suggests that there is lack of 
business cycle synchronisation in both of the economic regions. This lack of business synchronisation 
indicates dissimilarities of economic structures in the regions. Furthermore, these divergences in 
business cycles suggest that a common monetary policy, exchange rate policy and a single currency will 
not be optimal for the regions at this stage. Thus, both economic regions do not constitute optimum 
currency areas (Kenen, 1963; Masson & Pattillo, 2004; Gayer, 2007, Drummond et al., 2015). This is 
because countries with divergent economic structures and business cycles require appropriate domestic 
monetary and exchange rate polies that respond to their domestic economic conditions. This 
dissimilarity of economic structures and business cycles imply that a single monetary policy will not be 
appropriate for the region as a whole and therefore should not adopt a monetary union (Mkenda, 2001). 
Tavlas (2009) warns that countries that adopt a monetary union without having business cycle 
synchronisation are more likely to accrue negative consequences instead of economic benefits. The 
finding on the SADC region is consistent with that of Nzimande and Ngalawa (2016), a study conducted 
in the same region, which applied a Dynamic Factor Model. Similarly, the finding on the EAC region is 
also in congruence with a previous study conducted in the region (Buigut & Valev, 2005). 
 
4. Conclusion and Recommendations 
This paper has empirically assessed the feasibility of monetary union in the SADC and EAC regions by 
determining the similarities of the economic structures in the regions through business cycle 
synchronisation. The symmetry/asymmetry of the economies in the two regions was conducted through 
correlations analysis and Granger Causality Test. The correlation analysis of economic growth indicated 
that the SADC region does not constitute an OCA in as far as business cycle synchronisation is 
concerned. Whilst EAC region is in a much better position than the SADC region, however, there is no 
convincing evidence that suggests business cycle synchronisation, therefore, it also does not constitute 
an OCA. The results of the correlation analysis in both regions were confirmed through the T-Y Granger 
causality test, inter alia no evidence of business cycle synchronisation was found in the two regions. 
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In a nutshell, both correlation analysis and Granger causality test suggest that there is overwhelming 
lack of business cycle synchronisation in the two economic regions. Both economic regions do not 
constitute optimum currency areas. Thus, it is not feasible to form a monetary union in these two 
economic regions as envisaged in their respective protocols. The two economic regions, therefore, need 
to set and coordinate major macroeconomic policies to further integrate their economies which will lead 
to more favourable conditions for a monetary union that shall take place in the future. The coordination 
of these macroeconomic policies will play a major role in achieving sustainable economic development 
goals in their respective regions. In addition to smoothing of business cycle synchronisation in the 
regions, this will also assist in alleviating the problem of excessive economic migration on the continent. 
A specific recommendation with regard to the SADC region is to expand the existing Common 
Monetary Area (CMA) which includes South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland gradually to 
other qualifying countries in the region instead of embarking a SADC-wide approach to a monetary 
union. 
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